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Abstract
Companies increasingly involve the crowd for collective
decision making and, to aggregate the decisions, they
commonly average the scores. By ignoring
crowdworkers’ different levels of experience and
decision biases, this method may not favor the best
outcome. Alternatively, decisions can be weighted in
favor of the more experienced judges in the crowd.
However, previous research is inconclusive as to
whether more experienced individuals are any better at
avoiding decision biases. To answer this question, we
conduct online crowd-based experiments with a range
of treatments, comparing the anchoring effect of
individuals with different levels of experience. Results
indicate that not only does greater experience not
protect crowdworkers from the anchoring effect but it
increases their confidence in their decision, compared
to less experienced individuals, even if they are wrong.
Our findings provide valuable insights for both
researchers and practitioners interested in improving
the effectiveness of crowdworking decision-making.

1. Introduction 1
Companies using crowdworking for idea generation
often face the challenge of having to screen hundreds or
thousands ideas submitted by the crowd. How do they
select the more valuable ones out of a vast number of
ideas? For example, when the car manufacturer Fiat
turned to the crowd to suggest ideas for its new Fiat 500
model, the call generated over 170,000 design ideas and
more than 20,000 comments on specific aspects, such as
the shape of the exhaust or of the chrome bumpers [1].
Since most companies do not have the resources to
evaluate such a large number of ideas, or only with
disproportionate effort, the crowd is increasingly used
not only to generate new ideas but also to evaluate them,
thus doubling up the challenge of how to tackle the

number of ideas generated and evaluated. Nevertheless
the method of using a large number of judgements - the
so-called wisdom of the crowd – continues to offer key
advantages by i) maximizing the amount and the
diversity of information by drawing on a large number
of people from a wide range of information backgrounds
and, ii) reducing the potential impact of ‘outliers’ extreme decisions based on unreliable or simply
inaccurate information sources. For a crowd to be wise,
however, it has to meet the following conditions: i) it
must be diverse, ii) decentralized, and iii) independent
in its judgement [3]. The downside of the wisdom of the
crowd, as the literature also suggests, is that individuals
might be biased in their decision-making. Based on
insights from cognitive psychology, biased decision
making, often simply labeled as “decision biases”, can
be described as “[…] human behavior which goes
beyond the rationality assumptions of neoclassical and
new institutional economic theory” [4]. Examples of
decision biases include individuals failing to adequately
judge probabilities, making wrong predictions or being
too extreme in their judgement [5].
Another prominent bias that might occur in the
context of idea evaluation by an online-crowd is the
well-established anchoring effect [6]. This effect
describes a disproportionate influence that an initially
presented value has on a decision maker [6]. The
reasons for the occurrence of this bias in this context are
as follows: First, online platforms are characterized by
increasing information richness and often provide
information such as ratings given by other workers ([7],
[8]), which could act as an anchor [9]. Second,
especially in organic crowdworking campaigns where
the judgement process is structured into two or more
phases, the risk of the anchoring effect occurring is quite
high when the information which potentially acts as
anchor is revealed to workers in subsequent stages [10].
Lastly, the anchoring effect occurs for both types of
tasks, objective (e.g. estimating the height of the Eiffel
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tower) and subjective estimations (evaluating the
creativity of an idea) [11], which covers the majority of
typical task designs on crowdworking platforms.
Regardless of this potential risk of biased decision
making, currently the favorite method for using the
wisdom of the crowd approach is to simply average the
judgements of all individual decisions in the crowd [12],
even though this can lead to suboptimal outcomes
neglecting, as it does, external information such as
experience. As an alternative to simply averaging
individual judgements, researchers (e.g. [13]) have
proposed weighted models that favor more experienced
judges in the crowd. The assumption behind this
approach is that more experienced judges are less likely
to be affected by the anchoring effect or, if they are
affected, that their estimation will still be more valid
than that of a less experienced person. However,
previous studies on decision making in the offline
context show contrasting results. While some studies
indicate that knowledgeable people are less influenced
by biases (e.g. [14]), others show that even
knowledgeable people with experience in a given
context are significantly biased (e.g. [15]). With respect
to these conflicting results, we want to shed light on this
question and aim to answer the following research
question:
Are more experienced people in the crowd less prone to
the anchoring effect in their decision-making?
To answer this question, we conducted experiments
on a commercial crowdworking platform, with the
crowd being given 80 different business model ideas to
evaluate. We implement an anchor, i.e. information
about the previous rating results given by others, using
it as a treatment, and analyze its effect on individual
raters’ decisions. After idea evaluation, we asked each
participant about her background experience, using
several dimensions of experience relevant to the task,
such as business models, product category, their
experience in retail and how long they have been a
member of the platform. In addition, after have
completed their evaluation, raters were asked how
confident they felt about their ratings. Results indicate
that experience in different dimensions does not
decrease the probability to follow an anchor and
therefore does not protect against biased decision
making. Moreover, experienced judges are more
confident about their decision, even if they are wrong –
in our case, deviant from experts’ ratings, which we
used as a benchmark.
Our study makes contributions to extant research in
several ways: (1) in contrast to most previous studies,
our research on the anchoring effect is conducted in the
context of the large and still growing field of

crowdworking, following the proposed call for
additional research on cognitive biases in the IS context
[8]; (2) we extend prior research on the anchoring effect
by taking into account not only one but several
dimensions of experience (product, context, etc.); (3) we
use a subjective evaluation task in contrast to objective
tasks such as general knowledge questions; (4) we
investigate the robustness of weighted models to
aggregate multiple opinions that favor more
experienced judges in the crowd. This allows us to
investigate whether these models could be used to
provide valid results, even if potentially biased
decisions might occur within the crowd. Lastly, our
analysis offers valuable insights for practitioners, by
helping task designers in crowdworking to avoid
potential pitfalls.

2. Related Literature and Hypotheses
2.1. Anchoring Effect in Decision Making
Because of humans’ bounded cognitive resources
[16], if humans would strictly adhere to the laws of logic
and probability, even a single complex everyday
situation would require more computations than can be
performed in a human lifetime [17]. Therefore, people
tend to apply fast but fallible heuristics in their daily life
to reduce the complexity of their decision making. The
downside of this, however, are cognitive biases like the
anchoring effect. The anchoring effect describes the
disproportionate influence of an initially presented
value on decision makers [6]. This cognitive bias is
subconscious and involves noticing an initial value or
starting point (the anchor), which influences one’s
decision (subconsciously) by adjusting one’s response
in a direction that seems appropriate.
The main underlying mechanisms of anchoring are
selective accessibility [18] and confirmatory search
[19]. Selective accessibility in this case means that as
long as an initially presented anchor lies within the
boundaries of a known category (for example: the
height of the Eiffel tower is about 300 meters and not
3,000), participants construct a mental model that
selectively increases the accessibility of anchorconsistent information [18]. In line with that,
confirmatory search means that when a plausible anchor
is presented, people focus on activating information that
is consistent with this value and neglect information that
deviates from the anchor [19]. The occurrence of the
anchoring effect has been shown in a variety of different
domains such as general knowledge [20] or probability
estimation [19]. Previous studies show that both
uninformative anchors and anchors with informational
relevance to the task itself are able to influence a
decision. In their classic study, [6] randomly generated
anchor values were obtained by spinning a wheel of
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fortune between 0 and 100 and afterwards asking the
participants to estimate the percentage of African
countries in the United Nations. The given anchor
values had a strong influence on their estimation since
higher anchors significantly increased the estimations
compared to lower ones [6]. Another study found that
the estimation of an athlete’s performance could be
anchored by the number on his jersey [21]. Anchors
with relevance to the task can also lead to the anchoring
effect: in an example from the legal domain, higher
damage awards were obtained when higher
compensations were requested in court [22]. Following
previous results, we assume that the anchoring effect
will generally affect a crowd’s decision making when an
anchor is displayed. More specifically, when comparing
the distribution of ratings with and without displaying
an anchor, we expect both results of the evaluation to
differ. Hence, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The distribution of ratings will differ
depending on whether an anchor is displayed.

2.2. Influence of Experience on Anchoring
Effect
Experience in the context of judges who evaluate
ideas with respect to creativity is defined as “[…] the
acquisition and cumulative knowledge of reality,
mechanisms, rules, and procedures related to a specific
domain” [23]. Previous literature on the influence of
experience on the anchoring effect shows contradictory
results. On the one hand, it suggests that experienced
people utilize information in their decision making
differently to those less experienced than them ([24],
[25]) since they:





process information more quickly due to
practice and skill
process information in their domain of
expertise more efficiently
know more than others and can access that
knowledge better
are less likely to be influenced by factors
that could influence information processing
and capacity allocation.

Hence, people with higher expertise should arguably be
less influenced by anchors. The assumption that greater
expertise and experience protects against the anchoring
effect to a certain extent is supported by previous studies
which assert that both people with high certainty about
their answer [19] and those with greater relevant
knowledge are less influenced by anchors [14].
Table 1 presents several studies of the influence of
experience on the occurrence of the anchoring effect.

Table 1. Studies on the influence of
experience on the anchoring effect
Article
Context
Experienced
less
influenced?
[14]
General knowledge
✓
questions
[19]
Lotteries
(✓)
[26]
Estimating the value
of houses
[27]
Judgements of event
probabilities
[28]
Fraud estimation and
critical event
prediction
[18]
Evaluating the value
of a cars
[15]
Hypothetical crime
case
On the other hand, results from other studies indicate
that an anchor does not only affect inexperienced
decision makers but also experts. For example, car
experts (dealers and mechanics) with all the necessary
information available were influenced by anchors when
evaluating the value of a car [18], and legal
professionals by information irrelevant to the case [15].
Regarding the latter, results of an experiment with a
hypothetical crime case show that judges’ sentencing
decisions were strongly influenced by the prosecutor’s
demand. The sentences given for the same hypothetical
crime case were significantly higher for participants
who were presented with a high sentencing demand than
for those with a low demand [15].
Based on these results it could be argued that the
underlying mechanisms for the anchoring effect are so
engrained in fundamental cognitive processes that
people regardless of their level of experience and
knowledge could fall victim to this effect. This
potentially invalidates the notion that anchors should
only affect inexperienced decision makers rather than
expert participants. Based on this argument and the
majority of results in the field that demonstrate that
anchoring has a robust effect on human decision making
regardless of the experience of decision makers, we
derive our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Higher experience does not decrease
the probability to follow a displayed anchor.
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3. Research Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we design an experiment
which enables us to (1) analyze the occurrence of the
anchoring effect in idea evaluation on a crowdworking
platform and (2) investigate whether experience might
protect people from being influenced by the anchoring
effect. In the context of crowdworking, idea evaluation
tasks for new products, services or business models
represent a typical task [9]. The ideas in our experiment
were taken from previous research [29], in which
students generated business model ideas for perfume in
a classroom experiment. After having been given basic
knowledge about business models and the Business
Model Canvas [30], participants generated business
model ideas for perfume. Only the best ideas, selfselected by each participant, were collected. All ideas
are presented in the same way, consisting of the nine
elements of the Business Model Canvas [30]. We then
designed an evaluation task on Crowdflower, a
commercial crowdworking platform which draws on
potential contributors distributed worldwide. Because it
would be unreasonable to ask each participant to
evaluate all 80 business model ideas, we divided the
ideas into eight blocks of ten ideas each and randomly
assigned each business model idea to one block. Each
participant had to rate the displayed ideas on a sevenpoint scale in terms of creativity, novelty and usefulness
[31]. This part of our experiment represents the control
condition in which each individual had to evaluate the
ideas without encountering an anchor. We further
designed two additional experiments with two different
treatments, enabling us to investigate the anchoring
effect. First, we designed an experiment (Crowd
Anchor) where the information about the previous
evaluation resulting from the control condition of each
idea was displayed above the rating scale. Second, we
designed an additional experiment (Random Anchor)
where the only difference was that for the displayed
rating, each idea was assigned a randomly generated
rating between 1.0 and 7.0. The general task design of
the control condition was retained for both additional
experiments. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of a rating
scale in one of the treatment conditions with the anchor
displayed in the left-hand corner above the rating scale.

Figure 1. Treatment with displayed anchor
To investigate whether we find support for our first
hypothesis, i.e. the general occurrence of the anchoring
effect, we compare the average ratings of ideas for each

experimental condition. Further, we also analyze the
rating distributions of the different experimental
conditions to see whether the display of an anchor
influences the overall rating distribution as well as the
potential deviation of ratings from experts’ evaluation.
Finally, we consider the influence of experience on
anchoring. The experimental design is illustrated in
Figure 2.

Figure 2. Experimental design
To avoid the occurrence of a learning effect and
potential rating bias through users who assign
themselves to several tasks in succession, we allowed
each participant to evaluate only one block. Each block
of ideas was evaluated by twenty different contributors,
each earning 0.50$ for the evaluation of one block (= ten
ideas). After idea evaluation was completed, we prescreened the rating of each idea and excluded all those
with a standard deviation below 0.5, assuming that
below this threshold, participants wanted to earn money
as easily as possible and merely clicked through the task
quickly. In sum we analyzed 4,560 individual ratings,
1,490 for the control condition and 3,070 for both
treatment conditions.
To analyze the influence of experience, all
participants had to complete a short survey in addition
to the evaluation task. The aim of the survey was to
collect a range of data to assess participants’ experience
or prior knowledge across the following dimensions:
Context/market mechanism, platform experience,
product knowledge, and business models. More
specifically, we asked participants about the length of
their membership on the platform in number of months
(platform experience), their experience in retail in
number of months (context/market mechanism), their
knowledge about perfume (four items, product
knowledge), and their experience of business models
(two items). After the idea evaluation was completed,
we further asked each subject to rate their confidence in
evaluating the business model ideas presented to them.
All scales ranged from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 =
“Absolutely agree”. Additionally, to find out whether
the randomly assigned rating of an idea strongly
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deviates from a more professional evaluation of idea
quality, we recruited two experts who would serve as a
benchmark [32]. One came from our university’s
entrepreneurship center and the other works as a senior
in-house consultant in a large corporation.

4. Results
4.1. Analyzing the General Occurrence of an
Anchoring Effect
We first calculated the average rating of each idea in
each experimental condition. In general, the descriptive
statistics (Table 2) of the different conditions do not
differ much from each other.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Condition
Obs.
Mean Std.
Min
Dev.

Max

No Anchor

80

4.58

.412

2.60

5.87

Crowd
Anchor

80

4.59

.479

3.35

5.50

Random
Anchor

80

4.39

.745

2.60

5.87

To further investigate the different ratings of each
idea in the different conditions, we compare their
average ratings, using parametric tests. First, we check
whether rating distributions show any significant
deviation from a normal distribution by using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test nor the Shapiro-Wilk test.
However, results of both tests show no significant
deviation from a normal distribution (lowest p-value:
.128). Next, we test for homogeneity of variance for the
average rating of ideas for each experimental condition
by conducting a Levene’s test based on the mean as well
as the median. Both results based on the mean F (2, 237)
= 19.27, p < .001 and median F (2, 237) = 19.04, p <.001
show significant results, implying that the homogeneity
of variances has been violated. Therefore, we conducted
t-tests specified for data with unequal variances.
Following [33], we additionally report the effect size for
each experimental condition. Table 3 presents results of
pairwise comparisons of the average ratings for each
experimental condition. First, comparing average
ratings for the condition where no anchor was displayed
with the condition where the average rating resulting
from the control condition of each idea was displayed
above the rating scale, shows no significant difference
in ratings. However, this result is not surprising since we
did not expect the display of the average rating from the
control condition to significantly change the rating for
the first experimental condition (Crowd Anchor).

Table 3. Comparison of average ratings
Mean Std.
DiffEffect
Dev.
erence
Size (r)
No Anchor 4.584 .412
-.006
r = .007
Crowd
4.591 .479
(.462)
Anchor
No Anchor 4.584 .412
.187**
r = .154
Random
4.397 .745
(.025)
Anchor
Crowd
4.591 .479
Anchor
.193**
r = .153
(.026)
Random
4.397 .745
Anchor
Note: *p <.10; **p < .05; ***p< .01

Moreover, we expected both ratings to lead to
comparable results because the occurrence of an
anchoring effect in this case would mean that
participants incorporate the displayed anchor, based on
the previous decisions from the control condition, into
their decision. Comparing the random anchor with both
the crowd anchor and the control condition shows
statistically significant differences. Hence, we conclude
the following: first, the comparison between the control
condition and the situation where a randomly generated
rating is displayed demonstrates that the occurrence of
an anchor affects the subsequent rating. Second, the type
of anchor displayed also plays a role since comparing
both treatment conditions with different anchors leads to
a statistically significant difference in rating results. To
further investigate the general occurrence of the
anchoring effect, we also analyzed the distribution of
individual ratings from each experimental condition
(Figure 3). In contrast to the analysis of the average
rating above, we now compare the rating distribution of
each individual participant in each condition, i.e. 1,490
for the control condition and 3,070 for both treatment
conditions (out of a total of 4,560 individual ratings). As
can be seen, the given distributions differ depending on
whether and which anchor was shown in the condition.
First, we can see that in our first treatment condition
(Crowd Anchor) the range of ratings has been reduced,
while in our second treatment condition (Random
Anchor), the range of ratings has increased when a
randomly generated anchor was shown.
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This result is in line with the previous comparison of
average ratings above, supporting our interpretation that
the occurrence of an anchor effect in this case decreases
the variance of ratings, leading to comparable
evaluation results.

Figure 3. Distribution of ratings
This visual inspection supports our result that
participants incorporate the anchor provided and
moreover, that the specific value of the displayed anchor
strongly influences subsequent ratings.
In addition to a visual inspection of these
distributions, we compare the two rating distributions by
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. Our first
hypothesis is supported if the distributions significantly
differ from each other. Results are reported in Table 4.
Table 4. K-S statistics for comparison of
distributions
Conditions
Difference (Combined
K-S)
No Anchor .0716 (.001)***
Crowd Anchor
No Anchor .0851 (< .001)***
Random Anchor
Crowd Anchor .1378 (< .001)***
Random Anchor
Note: *p <.10; **p < .05; ***p< .01

Results indicate that the distribution of ratings in all
experimental conditions differ significantly from each
other. In addition, we investigate the potential negative
effect of anchoring, i.e. the tendency of decision makers
to make decisions towards a presented value that
deviates from the experts’ assessment. To investigate
this effect, we calculated the difference from each rating
to the experts’ rating and compared the differences of
crowd ratings to experts’ ratings for both experimental
conditions.
Table 5. Comparison of differences between
crowds’ rating and experts’ rating
Mean Std. Err.
Diff.
Crowd Anchor
1.329 .0255
-.2481***
(.0395)
Random Anchor 1.577 .0300
Note: *p <.10; **p < .05; ***p< .01

Results (Table 5) show that the randomly generated
anchor (Random Anchor) leads to a statistically
significant (p < .001) higher distance to the experts’
ratings than the displayed anchor from the control
condition (Crowd Anchor). This result highlights the
potential negative effect of anchoring, since initially
displayed wrong values (anchors) can significantly
increase the distance to the actual desired result.
Accordingly, we find support for hypothesis 1 since
the presence of an anchor changes the distribution of
ratings, implying the occurrence of an anchoring effect
in crowd decisions. Moreover, the anchoring effect is
robust for the anchors displayed in the different
experimental conditions.

4.2. Analyzing the Anchoring Effect in Relation
to Level of Experience
To find out whether more experienced people are
less prone to be influenced by an anchor, we investigate
whether participants followed it, additionally factoring
in the influence of participants’ experience. To answer
our research question, we investigate the data from our
two treatment conditions to see whether participants
followed the displayed anchor. We used a logit
regression with the dependent variable = 1 if the
person’s rating was consistent with the displayed
anchor. Due to the fact that people could only rate in
integers (for example: 4) while the anchor was provided
as a float (for example: 4.2), the dummy variable is = 1
if the person’s rating was closer to the provided anchor.
If the anchor was 4.4, for example, and the person rated
the idea with 4, the dummy variable would be 1. In
contrast, if the provided anchor was 4.6, the dummy
variable would be 1 if the person rated the idea with 5
since this value is closer to the provided anchor than 4.
To avoid multicollinearity in our model, since some
variables for experience consisted of several items, we
conducted a principal component analysis [34] to
summarize multi-item variables. Thus, we consider the
following model [35]:
Yj* = β0 + β1 Memj + β2 BMC_Expj + β3 Perf_Expj +
β4 Retail_Expj + β5 Conf_Ratingj + ɛj, Y = 1[Yj* > 0].
Memj represents the reported length of membership on
the platform of a person, BMC_Expj captures the multiitems for the reported experience in business models,
while Perf_Expj captures the different items for the
reported experience and knowledge of perfume.
Retail_Expj represents the reported experience in
months of a participant working in retail, while
Conf_Ratingj covers the reported confidence of the
participant when evaluating the business model ideas.
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Further, we use clustered robust standard errors on the
participant level to account for autocorrelation in the
data since each participant rated ten different ideas [35].
Results (Table 6) indicate that experience in different
dimensions, such as relevant to the key product
(perfume), using and evaluating business models or
having worked in retail, does not significantly decrease
the probability of following the displayed anchor.
Table 6. Results of logit regression
Variable
Coef.
Std.
z
Err.2
Memj
-.0004
.0031
-.013
BMC_Expj
-.0670
.0530
-1.26
Perf_Expj
.0617
.0385
1.60
Retail_Expj
-.0007
.0008
-.089
Conf_Ratingj
.0576
.0524
1.10
Constant
-1.212*** .2807
-4.32
Controls1
✓

P>
|z|
.893
.206
.109
.375
.272
.000

Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; 1Gender and age;
2clustered robust std. err. by participant

However, one might argue that especially when
analyzing the data from the condition where the average
rating from the control condition was displayed (Crowd
Anchor), it might be rational for participants to follow
the displayed average rating from the control condition
since their rating matches the average rating from the
control condition. To address this point, we again used
our logit model mentioned above and solely analyzed
the dataset from our second treatment condition
(Random Anchor). Since we displayed randomly
generated ratings as anchors for each idea, we assume
that the probability that these anchors match the quality
of ideas or reflects the professionals’ rating of the idea
(= experts’ rating) is quite low. Further, we only analyze
ideas where the difference between the displayed anchor
and the experts’ rating was ≥ 2. In sum, we analyzed 740
observations. Results are illustrated in Table 7.
In line with previous results, the estimators indicate
that experience does not significantly decrease the
probability to follow the displayed anchor, which
applies even when the displayed anchor strongly
deviates from the quality of the ideas (difference ≥ 2
from experts’ rating). These results are constant for
different dimensions of experience. Thus, our results
support our second hypothesis. In other words, a higher
level of experience does not increase protection against
making a biased decision by following a randomly
generated anchor.

Table 7. Results of logit regression for random
anchors with difference to experts’ rating ≥ 2
Variable
Coef.
Std.
z
P>
Err.2
|z|
Memj
.0096
.0066 1.45 .147
BMC_Expj
-.0423
.1278 -.33
.740
Perf_Expj
-.0029
.0880 -.03
.974
Retail_Expj
.0001
.0018 .08
.937
Conf_Ratingj
.2292*
.1380 1.66 .097
Constant
-2.859*** .7665 -3.73 .000
Controls1
✓
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; 1Gender and age;
2clustered robust std. err. by participant

Surprisingly, our results indicate that people who
follow the displayed anchor in this situation feel more
confident about their rating. However, we assume that
higher confidence does not increase the probability to
follow the anchor. Rather, we suspect a reverse effect.
More specifically, we assume that participants who
follow the anchor feel more confident about their rating.
Hence, when participants in our experiment rated the
idea as suggested by the displayed anchor, they felt
more confident about their decision since it seemed to
be in line with others.
In addition to investigating whether participants
follow the anchor displayed by using a dummy variable,
we further used a continuous variable to analyze the
potential influence of different dimensions of
experience on the occurrence of the anchoring effect.
Here we calculated the difference between the rating
submitted by each participant and the anchor displayed
for all participants in our second treatment condition
(Random Anchor). If the difference was negative (for
example: 2.4 [anchor displayed] – 4.0 [participants’
rating]) a positive value was calculated by multiplying
the value by minus one to avoid that negative and
positive values cancel each other out. We used these
differences as our continuous, dependent, variable and
the different dimensions of experience as independent
variables, and conducted a linear regression. If
coefficients of different dimensions for experience are
statistically significant and positive it would suggest that
experience does protect against the occurrence of the
anchoring effect.
Results (Table 8) indicate, however, that experience
does not significantly increase the distance between the
displayed anchor and the submitted rating, suggesting
that the more experienced still follow the anchor. In
contrast, both membership (in months) on the platform
and experience of using the business model canvas
seems to decrease the distance between the displayed
anchor and the submitted rating.
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Table 8. Results of linear regression for
random anchors
Variable
Coef.
Std.
t
P>
Err. 2
|t|
Memj
-.0069** .0027
-2.52 .013
BMC_Expj
-.0893*
.0480
-1.86 .065
Perf_Expj
.0740
.0496
1.49 .137
Retail_Expj
-.0003
.0005
-.65
.514
Conf_Ratingj
.0518
.0636
.82
.416
Constant
1.345*** .3479
3.87 .000
Controls1
✓
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; 1Gender and age;
2clustered robust std. err. by participant

Further, we used the difference between the displayed
anchor and the submitted rating as continuous variable
and conducted a linear regression for the second
treatment condition (Random Anchor) where the
difference between the displayed anchor and the
experts’ rating was ≥ 2. Hence, we analyzed a situation
in which we assume that the probability of the displayed
anchors matching the quality of ideas or reflecting the
professionals’ rating of the idea (= experts’ rating) is
quite low.
Table 9. Results of linear regression for
random anchors with difference to experts’
rating ≥ 2
Variable
Coef.
Std.
t
P>
Err. 2
|t|
Memj
-.0116*** .0040
-2.83 .005
BMC_Expj
-.0678
.0666
-1.02 .310
Perf_Expj
.0841
.0733
1.15 .253
Retail_Expj
-.0002
.0007
-.30
.762
Conf_Ratingj
.0742
.0844
.88
.381
Constant
1.583***
.4900
3.23 .002
Controls1
✓
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; 1Gender and age;
2clustered robust std. err. by participant

In line with previous results, the coefficients indicate
that experience does not significantly increase the
distance between the displayed anchor and the
submitted rating (Table 9). Again, the opposite is the
case since membership (in months) on the platform
seems to decrease the distance between the randomly
generated anchor and the submitted rating of
participants.
Next, we further investigate the influence of the
length of platform membership on the confidence of
ratings since previous results indicate that (i)
participants who follow the displayed anchor feel more
confident about their decision (Table 7), and (ii) that
membership on the platform (Table 9) decreases the

distance between a randomly generated anchor and
participants’ rating. Therefore, we want to answer the
question of whether more experienced people feel more
confident in the assessment, even if they are wrong.
Based on our previous results and in line with the
literature, (e.g. [15]) which used experience working on
a job as a proxy for experience, we use a participant’s
length of platform membership as a proxy of experience.
We differentiate between two groups: experienced
(membership
>=12
months)
and
relatively
inexperienced participants (membership <12 months).
Further, we define a “wrong decision” as a submitted
rating which deviates at least 2 points from the experts’
evaluation. We used a two-sided t-test to compare the
confidence in being wrong (as defined above) for both
groups. In sum, we analyzed 936 observations from both
experimental conditions. Results (Table 10) show that
more experienced participants are statistically
significantly (p = .002) more confident about their rating
even if this rating is wrong in the sense that it strongly
deviates from experts’ rating.
Table 10. Participants’ confidence in being
wrong
Membership
Mean
Std.Err.
Diff.
<12 months
5.00
.0437
-.1881***
(.0671)
>=12 months
5.18
.0509
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; Non-parametric test
leads to qualitatively comparable results.

5. Conclusion
The currently most commonly used application to
aggregate multiple judgements in crowdworking
consists of simply averaging individual judgements,
which entails several disadvantages and is susceptible to
systematically ignores biased decisions. Hence, to
overcome these problems researchers have proposed
weighted models that favor more experienced judges in
the crowd. However, this approach assumes that more
experienced people are less inclined to making biased
decisions.
Therefore, we investigate whether more experienced
people in a crowd are less prone to decision biases. By
conducting several experiments on a crowdworking
platform, using the established anchoring effect as a
treatment [6], we aim to shed light on this question.
While previous literature on the influence of experience
on the anchoring effect shows contradictory results, our
results indicate that experience in different dimensions
does not decrease the probability of following an anchor
and therefore does not protect against biased decisionmaking. This result is consistent across different
anchors. In addition, experienced members in the crowd
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feel more confident about their decision than less
experienced persons, even when they are wrong (i.e.
deviate from the experts’ evaluation of idea quality).
We contribute to the body of literature on
mechanisms of aggregating multiple judgements in
crowdworking. In contrast to the previous literature in
this context which compared the absolute results of
different aggregating mechanisms, we specifically
investigate the potential of the occurrence of biased
decisions for a weighted aggregation mechanism. We
also contribute to the literature on the anchoring effect,
specifically in respect of the influence of experience on
the occurrence of this effect. Further, in contrast to
previous research in the offline context which mainly
focused on one dimension of experience (e.g. number of
years working in a specific job), we take several
dimensions of experience into account and investigate
their respective influence on anchoring. Our results also
carry managerial implications.
First, companies who want to use the crowd for idea
evaluation should be aware that even experienced
members of the crowd might be influenced by anchors.
Hence, weighted mechanisms to aggregate multiple
judgements should be chosen carefully since this
mechanism can also lead to biased results. Second, from
the perspective of crowdworking platform designers,
especially where the judgement process is divided into
two or more steps, our results highlight that displaying
the information (e.g. judgements results) from previous
process steps in the following steps should be
considered with caution, if biases are to be avoided.
While our study provides important contributions,
we also acknowledge certain limitations. First, selfreported experience might not be an objective measure
since participants might over-or underestimate their
own experience. However, we argue that self-reporting
to collect information about participants’ experience is
a common practice in experimental research and also
used in several other studies (e.g. [36]). Further, even if
over-or underestimation in self-reported experience
might have occurred, this should not lead to a systematic
difference between the participants in the different
experimental conditions. Second, the task assigned to
the crowd (i.e. evaluation of business models for
perfume) might be quite specific. However, since we
conducted several experiments on a commercial
crowdworking platform, our task design had to appear
natural in this context since the crowd usually solves
similar kinds of tasks. Finally, we did not measure
experience with regards to having knowledge of biases,
e.g. whether participants are aware of these and try to
avoid them. However, we suggest that additional studies
involving other ideas or tasks should be conducted to
investigate whether the effect is constant for different
tasks or types of ideas. Future work could seek to gain

additional insight into the reasons for biased decision
making. For example, using the “think aloud method”
(e.g. [37]) by asking subjects in a laboratory setting to
talk through their idea evaluation could help to
understand the cognitive processes involved when
solving the given tasks, enhancing our understanding of
decision biases.
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